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According to previous research, changing the default contribution rate for a 401(k) pension plan has
a powerful effect on the distribution of contributions among relatively new employees. Potential explanations
include the following: (1) opting out may entail significant effort and inconvenience; (2) the default
rate may serve as a psychological anchor, influencing choices because of its salience or imprimatur;
(3) workers may procrastinate, putting off the opt-out decision; (4) workers may be inattentive. We
examine the welfare implications of defaults under each of these theories. Because three of them involve
non-standard behavioral hypotheses, we adopt and implement the framework for behavioral welfare
economics proposed by Bernheim and Rangel (2009). In each case we begin by developing theoretical


















Starting with Madrian and Shea (2001), several studies have found that changing the de-
fault contribution rate for a 401(k) pension plan has a powerful eﬀect on the distribution of
contributions among relatively new employees.1 The magnitude of that eﬀect dwarfs those
of more conventional policy instruments such as capital income taxes, which receive far more
attention. Potential explanations include: (1) opting out entails eﬀort and inconvenience; (2)
the default rate serves as a psychological anchor, inﬂuencing choices because of its salience
or imprimatur;2 (3) workers procrastinate, putting oﬀ the opt-out decision; (4) workers are
inattentive.3 We examine the welfare implications of defaults under choice patterns that
can be rationalized by each of those theories. Because three of them involve non-standard
behavioral hypotheses, we implement the framework for behavioral welfare economics pro-
posed by Bernheim and Rangel (2009). In each case we develop theoretical principles and
then analyze data to reach concrete quantitative conclusions.
Previous theoretical discussions of default eﬀects provide conﬂicting policy recommenda-
tions. Invoking a principle of ex post validation, Thaler and Sunstein (2003) propose that
companies should set defaults to minimize opt-out frequencies. Yet Carroll et al. (2009)
a r g u et h a ti fp e o p l ea r es u ﬃciently time inconsistent, it is optimal (under the “long run”
criterion) to force active decisions by setting a highly undesirable default.
Our main theoretical contributions are as follows. First, we show that a generalized
Pareto improvement criterion favors a default contribution rate of zero in all cases. Sec-
ond, we demonstrate that, when default eﬀects arise from small opt-out costs, the surplus-
maximizing default rate coincides with either the minimum allowable contribution rate (usu-
1See also Choi et. al (2002, 2003, 2003, 2006), Beshears et. al. (2008), and Carroll et. al. (2009).
Bronchetti et. al. (2011) describe a related context in which no default eﬀect is observed.
2A series of studies have documented the importance of anchoring eﬀects in the laboratory; see, for
example, Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec (2003).
3The existing evidence on attention is both limited and inconclusive. According to Carroll et. al. (2009),
a survey of unenrolled workers that drew attention to 401(k) issues did not increase enrollment among
those who responded. Yet Karlan et. al. (2010) show that saving decisions are sensitive to attentiveness
manipulations in a related context.ally zero), the maximum allowable contribution rate, or the maximum matchable contribu-
tion rate. The considerations that favor those rates are also present (but may not be
dominant) when opt-out costs are large. Third, we provide a recipe for creating arbitrar-
ily large divergences between the opt-out-minimizing and surplus-maximizing default rates,
thereby establishing that opt-out minimization can be highly undesirable. Fourth, we point
out that the apparent desirability of an extreme default rate in settings with acute time
inconsistency is artiﬁcial, because it presupposes an inability on the part of the employer
to penalize inactive decisions or reward active ones. We also provide a new theorem that
facilitates the application of the Bernheim-Rangel welfare framework to applied problems.
To conduct quantitative welfare analysis, we calibrate choice mappings consisistent with
each of the four theories discussed above using data on distributions of 401(k) contribution
rates for three companies. Those data illuminate behavior on a limited domain over which
the four characteristic choice patterns are not sharply distinguished. Nevertheless, our re-
sults shed light on the reasonableness of each representation. Unrealistically large opt-out
costs are required to rationalize observed default eﬀects in the absence of non-standard behav-
ioral explanations. The problem is not resolved by assuming sophsiticated time inconsistency
unless one makes other unrealistic assumptions. Neither does naive time inconsistency plau-
sibly explain the observed behavior. In contrast, once the model is generalized to include
anchoring eﬀects, the estimated opt-out cost distribution becomes reasonable. Inattentive-
ness can also account for observed default eﬀects, but we know of no independent evidence
that would allow us to evaluate the reasonableness of our parameterization.
We suspend disbelief concerning the reasonableness of any given representation and con-
duct welfare analysis assuming the full choice mapping (i.e., the mapping deﬁn e do ni t s
theoretical domain, and not merely on the observed domain) is consistent with a given
model, examining the four models one at a time. Assuming the full choice mapping is
consistent with a simple model of opt-out costs, we document a strong tendency for the
worker-surplus-maximizing default rate to coincide with the maximum matchable contribu-
2tion rate. Opt-out minimization is also typically achieved by setting the default equal to the
maximum matchable contribution rate, and hence is often worker-optimal. Roughly 30%
of the potential economic surplus ﬂowing from a 401(k) plan is lost when the default rate is
ineﬃciently set to zero. With matching provisions removed, the worker-surplus-maximizing
default rates vary widely across companies, and diverge from the opt-out minimizing default
rates. Deviations from the optima can still dissipate substantial portions of the surplus as-
sociated with a 401(k) plan, but opt-out minimization generally entails small welfare losses.
For choice mappings that are characteristic of the three remaining theories, we employ
the Bernheim-Rangel framework, wherein conﬂicts between evaluations made in distinct
welfare-relevant choice frames imply normative ambiguity. Assuming the full choice map-
ping is consistent with a model of anchoring, evaluations are highly frame-dependent; indeed,
the worker-surplus-maximizing default rate ranges from the smallest to the largest feasible
contribution rate, depending on the evaluation frame. Consequently, when all decision
frames are deemed welfare-relevant, the degree of normative ambiguity is substantial. How-
ever, when welfare is evaluated in an anchorless (and hence arguably neutral) choice frame,
worker surplus varies only slightly with the default rate, and hence the socially optimal
default contribution rate (accounting for costs to employers and the government) is zero.
Assuming the full choice mapping is consistent with models of either time inconsistency
or inattentiveness, the welfare implications of varying the default rate over the pertinent
range are relatively insensitive to the choice frame used for evaluation. Accordingly, even if
one treats all choices in all frames as welfare-relevant, the degree of normative ambiguity is
surprisingly small. The explanation is that, while as-if opt-out costs are large on average for
the entire population, they are small on average among workers who actually incur those costs
by opting out; hence, evaluating welfare from the perspective of choice frames that discount
those costs to diﬀering degrees makes little diﬀerence. As in the basic model, we therefore
see a strong tendency for the worker-surplus-maximizing default rate to coincide with the
maximum matchable contribution rate. We also examine whether it is desirable (from the
3perspective of a forward-looking decision frame) to force active decisions through extreme
defaults when companies can also directly penalize inactive choice. Optimal penalties are
either zero, in which case the optimal default problem is unchanged, or extremely large,
in which case the default matters very little. Finally, we ﬁnd that if all choice frames
are deemed welfare-relevant, the degree of normative ambiguity associated with any given
d e f a u l tr a t ei sg r e a t e rw h e no p t - o u tc h o i c e sa r em a d ei nf r a m e st h a ta r em o r ec o n d u c i v et o
contributing (e.g., precomittments in the case of time inconsistency). For our calibrated
models, the diﬀerence is tiny with time inconsistency but large with inattentiveness.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets forth the models
of default eﬀects. Section 3 reviews the Bernheim-Rangel framework and discusses its
application to the problem at hand. Section 4 develops conceptual insights for each theory
of default eﬀects and provides structure for our quantitative analysis. Section 5 explains how
we calibrate the models empirically, and Section 6 uses the calibrated models to investigate
welfare. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks. Proofs appear in an online appendix.
2M o d e l s o f d e f a u l t e ﬀects
2.1 The basic model of opt-out costs
Consider an individual who has recently become eligible to participate in his employer’s
401(k) plan. His total contribution rate x ∈ [0,x] ≡ X (contributions over earnings),
reﬂects his employee contribution rate, r, as well as his employer’s contributions. The plan
has a default employee contribution rate at which the total contribution rate is d ∈ [0,x].
We focus on the initial choice (in “period 0”) between (a) accepting the default and (b)
o p t i n go u ta ts o m ec o s te (reﬂecting inconvenience and eﬀort) by selecting x ∈ X\d.
As of period 0, the worker cares only about e and his (possibly state-contingent) future
consumption trajectory, c, which encompasses not only goods but also eﬀort subsequently
expended to change contribution rates.4 Period 0 preferences correspond to a utility function
4The elements of c are potentially indexed by both time and states of nature. All consumption, other
4u(e,ω)+U(c,θ),where ω and θ are (potentially overlapping) parameter vectors and u(0,ω)=
0.L e t u(e0,ω) ≡− γ ≤ 0,w h e r ee0 is the ﬁxed eﬀort level required to opt out of the default.
The period 0 choice of x matters because it determines his current 401(k) saving, his default
for the next period,5 and cash available for near-term consumption and non-401(k) saving
(z), all of which impact his subsequent opportunity set for c.
Choosing c to maximize U subject to future opportunity constraints (parameterized by
a vector π)f o rﬁxed x and z yields an optimal continuation consumption correspondence
C(x,z,θ,π). We assume that, given x, π does not depend on d.6 Deﬁning the indirect
utility function V (x,z,θ,π)=U(c,θ) for c ∈ C(x,z,θ,π),w ec a nw et r e a tt h ew o r k e r ’ s
problem as one of maximizing
W(e,x,z,ω,θ,π)=u(e,ω)+V (x,z,θ,π) (1)
over e, x,a n dz. Where needed, we assume V is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly qua-
siconcave in (x,z), and strictly increasing in both x and z,w i t hlimz→0 V (x,z,θ,π)=−∞
and limz→∞ V (x,z,θ,π)=+ ∞.
We allow the parameters ξ ≡ (γ,θ) ∈ [0,γ]×Θ ≡ Ω to diﬀer across workers,7 and use H
to denote their CDF. Except where stated otherwise, we assume H has full support on Ω
and γ is very large, so that the fraction of individuals opting out of any default lies strictly
between 0 and unity. We take Θ (and hence Ω)t ob ec o m p a c t .
Ac h o i c ex ∈ [0,x] yields
z =1− τ(x),( 2 )
where τ reﬂects deductibility of contributions as well as employer matching provisions. We
than e, takes place after period 0.
5In principle, these two eﬀects are separable (e.g., upon electing a contribution rate of 3%, the default for
the next period could change to 4%), but in practice they always go hand-in-hand (in the previous example,
the new default would be 3%).
6Future default rates depend on the initial default rate only indirectly through the initial contribution
rate (which in practice establishes a new default).
7We can simplify our notation by treating γ rather than ω as the preference parameter governing opt-out
costs because we take the opt-out technology as ﬁxed.
5assume τ is strictly increasing, continuous, convex, and piecewise linear, potentially with
a ﬁnite number of convex kink-points (to allow for declining match rates and match caps);
also, τ(0) = 0 and τ(x) < 1. Fixing e =0and maximizing (1) subject to (2), ignoring the
costs of opting out, yields an “ideal point” x∗(θ), which is unique and varies continuously
with θ under our assumptions. We assume that the (induced) distribution of x∗(θ) has full
support on [0,x],w i t ha t o m sa t0 ,x,a n dt h ek i n kp o i n t so fτ (if any), but nowhere else,8
and that the density is bounded at all other points. For any given worker, utility from the
default is V (d,1 − τ(d),θ), while utility from opting out is V (x∗(θ),1 − τ (x∗(θ)),θ) − γ.
H e n c e ,t h ew o r k e ro p t so u to fd to x∗(θ) iﬀ
∆(θ,d,π) ≡ V (x
∗(θ),1 − τ (x
∗(θ)),θ,π) − V (d,1 − τ(d),θ,π) ≥ γ.( 3 )
Notice that d enters only through the period 0 opportunity constraint for (e,x,z) bundles;
any choice of x renders the initial d subsequently irrelevant.9 That observation allows us
to simplify the analysis of optimal defaults by working with reduced-form preferences over
(e,x,z) bundles rather than primitive preferences over (e,c) bundles,10 and to implement our
framework empirically by estimating V rather than U, which we can accomplish with more
limited data. In taking this approach, it is possible that we will either (a) impose structure
on V that is inconsistent with the underlying optimization problem, or (b) fail to impose
structure implied by that problem. With respect to (a), our assumptions concerning V are
modest and largely innocuous.11 With respect to (b), we are skeptical of the prospects for
deriving helpful properties of suﬃcient generality; in any event, our theoretical analysis yields
useful insights without additional structure, and our empirical analysis adds appropriate
structure by ﬁtting V to data.
8This reasonable property can be derived from more primitive assumptions about the distribution of θ
and the properties of V , but the associated technical issues do not illuminate the problem of interest.
9This property hinges on the assumed absence of any relation between π and d,g i v e nx.
10Without knowing anything about the correspondence C, we can conclude that the bundle (e,c) for
c ∈ C(x,z,θ) is chosen over (e0,c 0) for c0 ∈ C(x0,z0,θ) from the observation that (e,x,z) is chosen over
(e0,x 0,z0).
11We explicitly acknowledge a potential exception in Section 6.1.
6For similar reasons, one can treat V as a ﬁx e df u n c t i o nw h e nd e r i v i n gc o m p a r a t i v e
statics describing the responses of x and z to temporary changes in parameters governing
the function τ (match rate, contribution cap, tax rate). However, permanent changes would
alter π, and consequently modify both the continuation consumption correspondence C and
the indirect utility function V .
2.2 Additional behavioral considerations
Next we present as-if models of anchoring, time consistency, and inattentiveness, and identify
their characteristic choice patterns (speciﬁcally, framing eﬀects).
Anchoring. With anchoring, the default rate d still impacts the opportunity set by
changing the eﬀort required to achieve any contribution rate, but it also establishes a psy-
chological frame, f = d, that inclines workers toward choosing x = f.W e c o u l d s e p a r a t e
those roles through choice experiments in which the default rate and the eﬀo r ts c h e d u l ev a r y
independently, e.g., by adding red tape to make some alternatives (including the default)
more or less time consuming than others, so as to reveal the choices workers would make with
a default frame f when the eﬀo r ts c h e d u l ef a v o r ss o m eo t h e rd 6= f. Because such variation
does not exist in practice, we must separate the framing and eﬀort-cost eﬀects empirically
through additional identifying assumptions (see Section 5).
To incorporate anchoring, we assume the worker acts as if the reduced-form indirect
utility function V depends on the default frame f ∈ [0,x].12 Accordingly, he maximizes
W(e,x,z,ω,θ,π,f)=u(e,ω)+V (x,z,θ,π,f),( 4 )
where V satisﬁes the same assumptions conditional on each frame f. W ea s s u m et h a tt h e
induced distribution of the worker’s as-if ideal point, x∗(θ,f),h a sf u l ls u p p o r to n[0,x],w i t h
atoms at 0, x,a n dt h ek i n kp o i n t so fτ (if any), but nowhere else, for all f.F o r s o m e
purposes, we also assume that an increase in f weakly shifts the individual’s choices toward
12In principle, one could allow for negative or arbitrarily large default frames, even though these are not
institutionally permissible. However, if suﬃciently extreme defaults would have no marginal inﬂuence on
choice, the bounds are inconsequential.
7higher x (monotonicity).13 The opt-out decision is still governed by (3), except that f
appears as an additional argument of V (and hence ∆).
Our formulation is not meant to suggest that the default directly aﬀects “true well-being;”
indeed, comparisons of V (x,z,θ,π,f) and V (x0,z0,θ,π,f0) are meaningful only if f = f0.14
On the contrary, we intend (4) merely as an analytic device for recapitulating the dependence
of a choice mapping on a decision frame f.
Time inconsistency. A worker can choose x either in a forward-looking frame f = −1
wherein he commits to a period 0 choice in advance, or a contemporaneous frame f =0
wherein he makes that choice “in the moment.” Choices made in either frame by itself are
observationally equivalent to the basic model. If default eﬀects are attributable to time
inconsistency, then the frequency with which workers opt out should diﬀer between the two
frames. We know of no direct evidence on that point.
To incorporate time inconsistency, we assume the worker acts as if he maximizes u(e,ω)+
βfV (x,z,θ,π),w i t hβ0 ∈ (0,1) in the contemporaneous frame (a period 0 choice), and
β−1 =1in the forward-looking frame (a “period -1” choice). To allow for the possibility
that β0 varies over the population, we modify our notation by writing ξ =( γ,θ,β0).W e
deﬁne x∗(θ) as in the basic model. For frame −1, (3) governs the opt-out decision. For





Inattentiveness. Whether an employee attends to the task of selecting a 401(k) contribu-
tion rate depends on the institutional environment created by his employer, which establishes
the psychological frame, f. We assume the worker behaves as if he attends if and only if
t h ec h o i c ei ss u ﬃciently consequential, in the sense that the stakes exceed some threshold,
χ(f). Thus, the worker attends and opts out if and only if
13Formaly, if W(e,x,z,ω,θ,f) ≥ W(e0,x 0,z0,ω,θ,f),w h e r ex>x 0 and z<z 0,t h e nW(e,x,z,ω,θ,f0) >
W(e0,x 0,z0,ω,θ,f0) for f0 >f.
14Like θ, f parameterizes ordinal preferences over (e,x,z) bundles.
8∆(θ,d,π) ≥ χ(f)+γ,( 6 )
Because the institution ﬁxes the frame f, we will sometimes suppress f in the notation,
writing χ rather than χ(f). We allow for the possibility that χ varies over the population,
and modify our previous notation by writing ξ =( γ,θ,χ). We assume that the ranking
of frames by χ is the same for all workers, and assign labels to frames so that χ is strictly
increasing in f.15 We posit the existence of some frame f least conducive to attention, and
assume that, for any default d, the set of workers opting out has positive measure even with
f.W e d e ﬁne x∗(θ) as in the basic model.
Choices made in any frame by itself are observationally equivalent to the basic model.
If default eﬀects are attributable to inattentiveness, opt-out frequencies should be sensitive
to interventions that manipulate attention. As mentioned previously, the evidence on that
point is both limited and mixed.
On the use of reduced form as-if representations: To justify analyzing choices over (e,x,z)
bundles while nevertheless treating the primitive choice objects as (e,c) bundles, we must
make the following assumptions. (1) C∗(x,z,θ,π) does not depend on the initial period
0f r a m e ,f. That is, the direct psychological inﬂuence of the initial frame is temporary:
it may inﬂuence the period 0 allocation between x and z, but not subsequent choices given
(x,z). (2) The worker chooses (e,C∗(x,z,θ,π,f)) over (e0,C∗(x0,z0,θ,π,f)) in period 0 with
full precommitment iﬀ he chooses (e,x,z) over (e0,x 0,z0) without precommitment. One can
interpret this assumption as requiring that the worker has sophisticated expectations with
respect to his future behavior (so that precommitting to what he would choose anyway is
irrelevant). As explained in Section 6, we do not see naive time inconsistency as a plausible
explanation for 401(k) default eﬀects. These assumptions imply that, for each individual,
any given (e,x,z) bundle is associated with a single (e,c) bundle regardless of d or f,b o t h
in reality and in the worker’s mind.
15Implicitly, we treat any set of frames yielding the same value of χ as a single frame.
93 Welfare criteria
3.1 The general framework
Assuming workers employ choice mappings characteristic of anchoring eﬀects, time incon-
sistency, or inattentiveness, we conduct welfare analysis using the framework for behavioral
welfare analysis proposed by Bernheim and Rangel (2009). Here we brieﬂyr e v i e wt h em e -
chanics of that framework and oﬀer a new result that facilitates practical applications. In
the next subsection we discuss issues related to our application.
The Bernheim-Rangel (henceforth BR) framework generalizes the standard normative
paradigm under the interpretation that welfare is deﬁned directly in terms of choice, rather
than underlying objectives, which may not be recoverable (see Bernheim, 2009). Its use
involves three steps: ﬁrst, specify the set of “welfare-relevant” choices; second, construct the
welfare criterion; third, apply it to the problem of interest. We review each step in turn.
Following BR, let X denote the set of all possible objects of choice. A generalized
choice situation (abbreviated GCS), G =( X,f), consists of a constraint set X ⊆ X and
a psychological frame f.16 A psychological frame is a condition under which a decision is
made, rather than a condition of experience, that aﬀects choice. Possible examples include
( b u ta r en o tl i m i t e dt o )t h ep o i n tt i m ea tw h i c hac h o i c ei sm a d eo rt h ew a yi n f o r m a t i o n
is presented. Either a theory or data provide us with a choice correspondence C deﬁned
on some domain of GCSs, G∗,w i t ht h ep r o p e r t yt h a tC(X,f) ⊆ X. Choices may exhibit
anomalies such as frame-dependence, intransitivities, and choice reversals.
The ﬁr s ts t e pi st os p e c i f yaw e l f a r e - r e l e v a n td o m a i n ,G ⊆ G∗. In some contexts we
may accept all GCSs as welfare relevant (G = G∗), but in others we may reﬁne that domain.
BR argue that the set of potentially valid reasons for excluding a choice situation from G is
limited. Philosophically, the libertarian principle of respect for choice (upon which both this
framework and the standard paradigm are based) does not allow one to overrule or ignore a
choice merely because the chosen option seems odd or one disagrees with the chooser about
16Bernheim and Rangel (2009) used the term “ancillary condition” rather than psychological frame.
10its merits. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to exclude a choice for which the individual’s
characterization of the opportunity set does not match the analyst’s characterization (i.e.,
cases of characterization failure).
To illustrate, suppose someone is presented with a choice between options x and y.H e
chooses x over y thinking incorrectly that y is z, even though he would choose y over x if
he recognized y as y. H e r e ,t h ec h o i c eo fx over y is not a suitable guide for a policy maker
who must choose between x and y on behalf of the individual. Rather, the policy maker
should either construe the choice of x over y as a choice of x over z, or (if the identity of z
is unclear) simply disregard that choice.
It is challenging to demonstrate that an individual’s characterization of an opportunity
set does not match that of the analyst. For example, someone who changes his behavior
after being alerted to a potential error may simply be responding to social pressure. Matters
are more promising if it can be shown that, in some particular type of frame, the individual
generally misunderstands or fails to process information that is essential for identifying the
opportunity set.
The second step in the BR framework is to construct the welfare criterion. If the choice
correspondence satisﬁes WARP on G, it can be represented by a standard preference relation,
and one can proceed as in the standard normative paradigm. However, if C violates WARP
on G, one must proceed diﬀerently.
BR argue that a choice-based welfare criterion should possess ﬁve features. First, because
welfare analysis is not only about identifying optima but also about comparing alternatives,
the criterion should entail a binary relation that identiﬁes improvements. Second, because we
seek a choice-based criterion, the relation should depend only on the choice correspondence,
deﬁned on the welfare-relevant domain G. Third, the relation should be coherent (i.e.,
at least acyclic). Fourth, it should respect unambiguous choice: if x is chosen over y in
some GCS and y is never chosen over x,t h e nx must be viewed as an improvement over
y. Finally, the relation should never overrule a valid choice (one within the welfare-relevant
11domain): if x is chosen from X in some GCS within G, then the relation must treat x as
unimprovable within X. T od oo t h e r w i s ew o u l db et od e c l a r et h a tc h o i c eam i s t a k e ,e v e n
though the choices remaining in G after step 1 are presumed to have been made with an
accurate understanding of the alternatives. Overruling such choices would be contrary to
the libertarian principles that the framework seeks to operationalize.
BR deﬁne the unambiguous choice relation, P∗, as follows: xP∗y iﬀ y is chosen in no
GCS where x is available. P∗ generalizes the standard (strict) revealed preference relation
P, in the sense that the two coincide when the choice correspondence satisﬁes WARP on the
welfare-relevant domain. P∗ satisﬁes the ﬁve requirements listed in the previous paragraph,
and it is the only welfare criterion that does so. Welfare analysis involving P∗ exploits the
coherent aspects of choice that are present in virtually all behavioral models, while expressing
the incoherent aspects of choice as ambiguity (incompleteness).
BR’s proposed criterion has several other attractive properties. First, given the breadth
of the framework, it is universally applicable. Second, its continuity properties imply that,
if one conducts welfare analysis based on a choice correspondence that is approximately
correct, the normative conclusions that emerge will also be approximately correct. Thus,
to justify the use of any given model in normative analysis, one need only argue that the
implied choice correspondence is approximately correct. The reasonableness of the model
as a depiction of decision processes is immaterial. Third, the framework is readily applied
to speciﬁc economic theories and easily adapted to empirical analysis. Because all welfare
statements are derived directly from the choice correspondence, any empirical representation
of a choice correspondence enables welfare analysis. Our current study illustrates that prin-
ciple. Finally, as we explain next, the framework yields generalizations of the standard tools
of applied welfare economics, including equivalent and compensating variation, consumer
surplus, and Pareto optimality.
A generalized notion of equivalent or compensating variation must accomodate any am-
biguity in the welfare criterion. Accordingly, for a change from policy p to policy p0,B R
12deﬁne EVA as the smallest (in the sense of inﬁnum) increment to income with p that such
that the bundle obtained with p is unambiguously chosen over (P∗) the bundle obtained
with p0. Similarly, EVB is the largest (in the sense of supremum) increment to income
with p that such that the bundle obtained with p0 is unambiguously chosen over (P∗)t h e
bundle obtained with p. I ti sa l w a y st h ec a s et h a tEVA ≥ EVB, and the two coincide with
the standard measure of equivalent variation when C satisﬁes WARP on G. BR generalize
compensating variation similarly.
In the BR framework, x is said to be a weak generalized Pareto optimum in X if there
is no y in X such that yP∗
i x for all individuals i.O n e c a n ﬁnd coventional Pareto op-
tima by maximizing either the weighted sum of utilities or, because equivalent variation is
a monotonic transformation of utility, the weighted sum of EVs.17 The following result
generalizes this property when P∗ is transitive (which holds for many behavioral models,
including those considered here):
Theorem 1: Suppose P∗ is transitive. Consider any non-negative weights λAi and λBi for
all individuals i such that
P
i (λAi + λBi)=1 . Let XM denote the set of alternatives
that maximize
P
i (λAiEVAi + λBiEVBi) within a set X. Then at least one element of
XM is a weak generalized Pareto optimum within X.
The task of applying P∗ to behavioral models is often simpliﬁed by virtue of the following
property. Suppose G = X×F ,w h e r eX is the set of opportunity sets and F is the set of
welfare-relevant psychological frames, and where the restriction of C to any f ∈ F satsiﬁes
WARP. Then P∗ is equivalent to the multiself Pareto criterion, treating each frame as a
diﬀerent self (BR, Theorem 3). That result does not apply with generality to the familiar
quasi-hyperbolic model of time-inconsistency because one cannot write G as the requisite
Cartesian product (decisions made at any given point in time cannot aﬀe c tp a s tc o n s u m p -
17If the opportunity set is not lower hemicontinuous in the amount of compensation, then EV need not be
a strictly monotonic transformation of utility. In that case, the set of alternatives that maximize aggregate
EV contains at least one Pareto optimum, but all the maximizers need not be Pareto optima. An analogous
technical qualiﬁcation appears in Theorem 1.
13tion).18 BR nevertheless derive an analytic representation of P∗ (assuming sophisticated
behavior) with no restriction on the welfare-relevant domain. They also examine a possible
domain restriction, which we discuss later.
3.2 Context-speciﬁcc r i t e r i a
As a practical matter, when applying the BR framework one must restrict attention to choice
mappings that allow for some limited set of behavioral patterns, rather than all conceivable
anomalies. In our analysis, we consider choice mappings that give rise to anomalies in the
context of initial 401(k) enrollment decisions, but not otherwise.19 We acknowledge that
psychological framing may also inﬂuence choices after “period 0,” and that consideration
of such eﬀects might lead to greater normative ambiguity when comparing consumption
trajectories.20 One could in principle consider a broader class of choice mappings that
subsume the ambiguities arising from a wider variety of time-inconsistent behaviors, but
implementation would then require much richer data than those currently available.
We have articulated each theory in Section 2.2 by explicitly deﬁning psychological frames
and providing a model of frame-dependent choice. Thus, once we deﬁne the welfare-relevant
domain G, application of the BR framework is straightforward. Signiﬁcantly, we can proceed
without taking any of the as-if theories literally as models of cognition; we are free to think of
them merely as analytically convenient representations of choice correspondences. Even so,
insights concerning cognition remain relevant because they can provide grounds for restricting
G. Here we consider potential theory-speciﬁcj u s t i ﬁcations for such restrictions.
Anchoring eﬀects. A potential strategy for restricting G is to admit choices only if they
18Technically, for the reduced-form model of time inconsistency described in Section 2.2, G∗ can be written
as the requisite Cartesian product, and thus the result does apply, because nothing is consumed in period
-1.
19Equivalently, one could say that we reﬁne the welfare-relevant domain to exclude choice situations giving
rise to anomalies other than those associated with initial 401(k) enrollment.
20For example, if a tendency to procrastinate when facing a 401(k) enrollment decision reﬂects a general
(rather than context-speciﬁc) tendency to make present-biased choices, then future choices aﬀecting the
worker’s consumption trajectory may also diﬀer according to whether they are made in forward-looking or
contemporaneous frames.
14are made in an arguably neutral frame where choices are free from the inﬂuence of anchors.
One possible candidate is a frame in which an active 401(k) election is a precondition of
employment. Decisions in that frame are free from contribution-rate anchors, but their
normative superiority to anchored choices is not obvious absent additional evidence. What
evidence would suﬃce? If it is possible to show that the presence of an anchor causes
the worker to ignore information he himself characterizes as pertinent (regardless of frame),
and that no such distraction occurs in the neutral frame, then arguably the worker correctly
characterizes his alternatives only in the neutral frame. Though we know of no such evidence,
we nevertheless conduct some welfare exercises under the maintained hypothesis that a
particular frame (deﬁned below) is neutral.
Time inconsistency.F o r t h e βδ model, BR show (Theorem 11) that restricting G to
choices that resolve all options at single points in time validates the “long-run” criterion (δ
discounting, ignoring β). That restriction may be justiﬁed on the grounds that other types
of decisions bring the potentially inconsistent objectives pursued at diﬀerent points of time
into conﬂict, producing outcomes of dubious normative signiﬁcance. Here, the long-run
criterion amounts to assessing welfare from the perspective of the forward-looking frame,
f = −1.
Inattentiveness. To the extent we take the as-if representation literally, G should be lim-
ited to choices made in a frame f with χ(f)=0so that the social planner does not emulate
neglectful decision makers.21 However, an empirically compelling justiﬁcation for that re-
striction would require more than a showing that choices respond to interventions intended
to manipulate attentiveness, as such interventions may also inﬂuence choices through other
mechanisms, for example by browbeating or embarassing the decision maker. The domain
restriction requires an explicit and credible demonstration that the workers who stick with
the default in some cases simply neglect their decisions (e.g., forget, or give the matter no
thought).
21If no such frame exists in practice, one could in principle impute the associated choices by observing the
decisions people make when they are attentive.
154 Welfare analytics
We now analyze the welfare implications of setting 401(k) default rates, where a hetero-
geneous group of workers face a single default. Our focus here is on worker welfare, but
Section 6 also provides empirical results on costs to employers (matching contributions) and
the government (foregone tax revenue). When analyzing aggregate economic surplus, we
abstract from distributional concerns by assuming that both earnings and the marginal social
value of a dollar are the same for all workers. One can reinterpret our analysis as pertaining
to cases in which preferences are homothetic, the cost of eﬀort is proportional to earnings
(e.g., because of the value of time), and the preference parameters (γ,θ) are distributed
independently of earnings. Changing d then has the same eﬀect within all income strata,
and hence one can take any given stratum as representative. Because π p l a y sn or o l ei nt h i s
analysis, we suppress it in our notation.
4.1 Welfare in the basic model
We begin with the Parteo criterion. Because x∗(θ) is assumed to have full support on [0,x],
every feasible d is Pareto optimal. However, the following simple observation provides a
possible justiﬁcation for favoring d =0 :
Theorem 2: Oﬀering a 401(k) plan in the current period weakly Pareto improves upon not
oﬀering such a plan if and only if d =0 .22
To assess worker surplus, we compute the equivalent variation (EV) associated with
switching from some initial regime to one in which the worker becomes eligible for the
401(k) in period 0 with an initial default rate of d. Recognizing that the reduced form
utility function V implicitly presupposes the availability of a 401(k) plan with a default rate
of x from period 1 onward, we compute EV based on an initial regime in which the worker
cannot contribute to a 401(k) in the current period, but can do so in future periods (with
an initial default of zero).
22For the purpose of this result, we take the features of any future 401(k) oﬀering as ﬁxed.
16For workers who do not opt out of the default, the EV is the value of m0(d,θ) satisfying
V (0,1+m0(d,θ),θ)=V (d,1 − τ (d),θ). For those who do opt out, the EV is the value
of m1(θ,γ) satisfying V (0,1+m1(θ,γ),θ)=V (x∗(θ),1 − τ (x∗(θ)),θ) − γ.23 Because the













where D(d) denotes the values of ξ for which the worker does not opt out. Only the second
term, which measures the incremental beneﬁt received by workers who elect the default,















In contrast, opt-out minimization requires us to solve maxd
R
D(d) dH(ξ), which (7) resem-
bles, except that the density dH(ξ) is weighted by m0(d,θ) − m1(ξ).T h a t d i ﬀerence can
give rise to large discrepancies. To see why, assume the cost of opt-out is zero for some
otherwise representative portion of workers, κ ∈ (0,1).24 Also assume there are no atoms
in the distribution of x∗(θ) on the interior of [0,x] (which could appear if τ were kinked).
Theorem 3: The worker-surplus-maximizing default rate is independent of κ, the fraction
of workers for whom the cost of opt-out is zero. In contrast, if that fraction is suﬃ-
ciently large, the opt-out minimizing default rate is either d =0or d = x.
Theorem 3 implies that the surplus-maximizing and opt-out minimizing default rates
may diﬀer substantially. That divergence occurs because m0(d,θ) − m1(ξ) is much smaller
on average for those who stick with the default when it equals 0 or x (because a positive
fraction of those individuals have zero switching costs) than for those who stick with any
other default (because a negligible fraction of those individuals have zero switching costs).
As we will see in the Section 6.1, Theorem 3 is empirically relevant.
23Given our assumptions on V , solutions to both equations exist and are unique.
24The same conclusion would follow if the costs for that group were simply very small.
17Our next result shows that 0, x,a n dt h ek i n kp o i n t so fτ (e.g., a match cap) are particu-
larly attractive from the perspective of surplus maximization. Deﬁne A ⊂ [0,x] to contain
those values, and assume that γ and θ are distributed independently so that we can change
the distribution of γ without altering that of θ.L e t Hγ and Hθ be the associated CDFs,
and recall that the support of Hγ is [0,γ].
Theorem 4: Consider a sequence of CDFs H
γ
k with γk → 0 and mean γk such that γk/γk >
e∗ for all k and some e∗ > 0.25 The surplus-maximizing default rates, d∗
k, converge to
ap o i n ti nA.
This result is notable given the historical prevalence of non-enrollment defaults (d =0 ),
but it also potentially argues for setting defaults equal to match caps. It exploits the fact
that, as the distribution of costs converges toward zero, both the maximand and the measure
of D(d) converge to zero, except at points in A, where the measure of D(d) remains bounded
away from zero. The larger the atom at a given point, the more attractive it becomes. As
we will see in the Section 6, elements of A frequently emerge as surplus-maximizing defaults
for the reasons highlighted by this theorem (even when opt-out costs are relatively large).
4.2 Welfare with additional behavioral considerations
For the three behavioral theories, generalized Pareto optimality is not a discerning criterion.26
However, Theorem 2 generalizes: the (weak generalized) Pareto improvement criterion im-
plies that the plan should have a default of zero and, in the cases of as-if time inconsistency
and inattentiveness, that the frame in which workers make the opt-out decision (fD)s h o u l d
be welfare-relevant frame least conducive to contributing (fM). Here we assume that the
welfare-relevant domain can be written as G = X×F ; fM is then deﬁned as the largest
element of F for the cases of time inconsistency and inattentiveness.
25The critical property is that the right tail of the distribution of γ n o tb et o ot h i c k ,w h i c hw ea s s u r eh e r e
in a simple way by placing a lower bound on the ratio of the mean to the maximum.
26Plainly, if there is some frame f and worker for whom x∗(ω,f)=d,t h e nd is a generalized Pareto
optimal default rate.
18Theorem 5: Regardless of whether the welfare-relevant domain is unrestricted or restricted
to any subset of frames, oﬀering a 401(k) plan in the current period creates a weak
generalized Pareto improvement over not oﬀering a plan in the current period if and
only if d =0and, for the cases of time inconsistency and inattentiveness, fD ≥ fM.
Moreover, for the cases of as-if time inconsistency and inattentiveness, (d,f)=( 0 ,f M)
creates a weak generalized Pareto improvement over (d,f)=( 0 ,f) for any f>f M.
Next we discuss aggregate surplus, taking the three theories one at a time.
Anchoring. For the special case where workers act as if default eﬀects arise solely from
anchoring rather than opt-out costs, we obtain a negative result: every default rate max-
imizes worker surplus (and hence is worker-optimal) from the perspective of some frame.
Consequently, we cannot say that any default is unambiguously better than another unless
we restrict the welfare-relevant domain.
Theorem 6: Assuming γ =0 , every default rate d maximizes EV for every worker evaluated
from the perspective of the frame f = d. With G = G∗, EVA is non-decreasing in d on
[0,x] and maximized at d = x, while EVB is non-increasing on [0,x] and maximized
at d =0 .
Despite its negative message, Theorem 6 does not imply that welfare analysis is unin-
formative in this special case. The range [EVA,EV B] still bounds the degree of ambiguity
concerning the worker beneﬁts, which is of interest, e.g., if the object is to compare the
beneﬁts of a 401(k) plan with its social costs. Also, as-if opt-out costs may be non-trivial,
and there may be sound justiﬁcations for domain restrictions.
Next we derive expressions for EVA and EVB allowing for positive as-if opt-out costs.
For those who do not opt out of the default, the EV evaluated from the perspective of frame
f is the value of m0
A(d,θ,f) (where the subscript A indicates anchoring) satisfying V (0,1+
m0
A(d,θ,f),θ,f)=V (d,1 − τ (d),θ,f). For those who opt out, the EV evaluated from
the perspective of frame f is the value of m1
A(d,ξ,f) satisfying V (0,1+m1
A(d,ξ,f),θ,f)=
19V (x∗(θ,d),1 − τ (x∗(θ,d)),θ,f) − γ. In both cases, m0
A and m1
A are monotonic in f (given
our monotonicity assumption), so we obtain EVA and EVB by evaluating EV in frames f = x
and f =0 , respectively.
















where DA(d) is the subset of ξ f o rw h i c ht h ew o r k e rd o e sn o to p to u t( ξ ∈ DA(d) iﬀ
m0
A(d,θ,d) ≥ m1
A(d,ξ,d)). If opt-out were costless, only the ﬁrst term would remain.
By Theorem 6, that term is maximized at d = f, the frame used for evaluation. Positive
opt-out costs introduce the second term, which resembles the maximand in (7), except that
the limits of integration depend on decisions made within the frame of the prevailing de-
fault rate, rather than the frame used for evaluation. The integrand is therefore generally
non-zero at those limits — positive at the opt-up boundary and negative at the opt-down
boundary for f = x, and conversely for f =0 . Because an increase in d reduces the opt-up
set and expands the opt-down set, the welfare eﬀect of increasing d ﬂowing through the limits
of integration are therefore positive for EVA and negative for EVB, which reinforces eﬀects
ﬂowing through the ﬁrst term. In contrast, the derivative of the second term’s integrand
can be positive or negative regardless of the frame, and may favor intermediate default rates,
just as in the basic model.
Time inconsistency: For those who do not opt out of the default, the EV evaluated from
the perspective of either frame is the value of m0
T(d,θ) satisfying V (0,1+m0
T(d,θ),θ)=
V (d,1 − τ(d),θ). For those who opt out, the EV evaluated from the perspective of frame f
is the value of m1
T(ξ,f) satisfying V (0,1+m1
T(ξ,f),θ)=V (x∗(θ),(1 − τ(x∗(θ))),θ) −
γ
βf.
When the opt-out choice is made in frame h, the aggregate EV given a default rate d from















dH(ξ) ,( 8 )
20where DT(d,h) is the subset of ξ for which the worker does not opt out in frame h (ξ ∈
DT(d,h) iﬀ m0
T(d,θ) ≥ m1
T(ξ,h)). When the choice frame and the evaluation frame coincide
(h = f), our analysis is the same as for the basic model (except that γ is inﬂated by the
factor 1
β0 for h = f =0 ). When those frames diﬀer, the choice frame h governs the opt-out
decision and hence the limits of integration for the second term, whereas the EVs for each
individual and hence the integrands reﬂect evaluation frame f. For the special case where
h =0and f = −1, our analysis resembles that of Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004). To
evaluate worker welfare without restricting G,w ec o m p u t eEVA in frame −1 and EVB in
frame 0 (because m1
T(ξ,−1) >m 1
T(ξ,0)).
Here we can also treat the choice frame as a policy instrument. For example, a company
could oﬀer workers opportunities to commit to making 401(k) elections by self-imposed
deadlines, with penalties for non-performance. Even without a restriction on G,o n ec h o i c e
frame may be preferrable to another (e.g., if choices in frame f are less damaging from the
perspective of frame f0 than are choices in frame f0 from the perspective of frame f).
With G restricted to choices made in the forward-looking frame, the best policy allows
for opt-out precommitment and sets the default rate exactly as in the basic model. The
absence of such arrangements may raise doubts about the applicability of the βδ model
(with sophistication), the welfare-relevance of the forward-looking frame, or both. Possibly
state-invariant precommitments entail high costs due to uncertainty concerning the future
opportunity cost of time, in which case it is appropriate to focus on policies that oﬀer opt-out
choices only in the contemporaneous frame (h =0 ).
Consider then the problem of maximizing (8) over d, ﬁxing h =0and evaluating welfare
in the forward-looking frame (f = −1). Suppose for the moment that opt-out costs are
universally small, but that many workers stick with the default because β0 ¿ 1.T h e n a n
extreme default rate achieves near-universal opt-out, which is nearly ﬁrst-best. In constrast,
with a moderate default rate, some workers adhere to the default despite substantial eﬃciency
losses. Accordingly, as Carrol et. al. (2009) observed, the optimum is to compel active
21decisions by setting extreme defaults.
We view the aforementioned policy prescription as artiﬁcial and unattractive for two
reasons. First, those who fail to opt-out either due to extreme present bias or (more likely)
inattentiveness must actually endure highly ineﬃcient consequences. Second, the default
rate is a blunt and potentially inappropriate instrument for encouraging opt-out. Simply
penalizing workers for failing to make active decisions accomplishes the same end without
distorting the default option.27 Note that we can incorporate non-monentary penalties into
our analysis (e.g., pressure, disapproval, etc.) by interpreting γ as a diﬀerential utility cost
and treating it as a policy instrument.
Inattentiveness: The EV formulas for our model of as-if inattentiveness are the same as
those for time inconsistency, except χ(f)+γ replaces
γ
βf. If we remain agnostic about the
cognitive interpretation of χ and treat choices frames as welfare-relevant regardless of whether
they are thought to encourage attentiveness, then we assess EVA in the fully attentive frame
and EVB in the least attentive frame. To evaluate welfare from the perspective of a fully
attentive frame (fa such that χ(fa)=0 ), we treat the welfare cost of opt-out as γ,e v e n
though the worker acts as if it is χ(fp)+γ (where fp is the prevailing frame). Because
we have no basis for assessing the largest value of χ(f) achieved in any pertinent frame, we
use the prevailing frame in place of the least attentive frame. Welfare analysis from the
perspective of fp treats χ(f) a sac o s t ,b u ti so t h e r w i s et h es a m ea sf o rt h eb a s i cm o d e l .
Just as with time-inconsistency, one can treat the choice frame as a policy instrument.
With G restricted to fully attentive choices, the ideal policy is to implement fa and set the
default exactly as in the basic model. We will assume that such measures either are not
cost-eﬀective, or are so invasive that they entail signiﬁcant psychological costs.
27An even more eﬃcient alternative would be to subsidize those who make active decisions and tax those
who do not, subject to a balanced-budget constraint.
225 Empirical calibration
5.1 Parameterization
The basic model. We assume the indirect utility function has the following form:
V (x,z,α,ρ)=ρln(x + α)+l n ( z).( 9 )
Thus, the vector θ consists of the pair (α,ρ). This speciﬁcation has the attractive implication
that the monetary value of the eﬀort required to opt out of the default does not vary with the
size of the worker’s desired 401(k) contribution. With α =0 , V is a Cobb-Douglas function
in x and z, expenditure shares are ﬁxed, the employee’s contribution rate, r, is unresponsive
to a temporary change in the uncapped employer match, and the marginal utility of 401(k)
contributions is (implausibly) zero for workers who prefer to contribute nothing. In contrast,
with α > 0, a temporary increase in an uncapped employer match rate increases the optimal
employee contribution rate, and the marginal utility of contributions can be positive even
when the worker’s ideal is to contribute nothing.28
Because α governs the sensitivity of the employee contribution rate to the concurrent
employer matching rate and tax rate, it can be identiﬁed from any data that reveals that
sensitivity. Match rates do not vary within ﬁrm in our data; however, we can identify the
relevant elasticity from the degree of bunching at kink points in the opportunity set (as in
Saez, 2009), which occur at the maximum matchable contribution rates. Larger values of α
imply larger elasticities, and hence more pronounced bunching.
We assume z =1 − tx






, xM is the total contribution rate when the worker reaches the cap on
matchable contributions,29 t is the tax adjustment parameter, and m is the matching rate.
One can interpret Z − 1 as the “virtual income” implicit in the kinked budget constraint
28We could also allow for responsiveness of the employee contribution rate to changes in an uncapped
employer match rate by relaxing the restriction that the elasticity of substitution between x and z is unity.
However, the data are insuﬃciently rich to permit us to identify both the elasticity of substitution and α.
29So, for example, if the employer provides a 50% match on employee contributions up to 6% of income,
then xM =0 .09.
23when x ≥ xM. Throughout, we assume t =0 .8 b e c a u s em o s tw o r k e r sf e l li n t ot h e1 5 %o r
25% marginal tax brackets during the relevant time period.
We assume ρ =m a x {e ρ,0}, where the CDF for the random variable e ρ,d e n o t e dF,i s
normal with mean μ and variance σ2. We assume the CDF for γ, denoted Φ,i sam i x t u r e





λ1 +( 1− λ1)(1 − e−λ2γ) for γ ≥ 0
0 for γ < 0
The parameter λ1 represents the fraction of workers who act as if opt-out costs are negligible.
We take the distributions of e ρ and λ to be independent. We treat α as a ﬁxed parameter,
common to all workers.
Because some groups of employees may be more motivated savers than others, we allow
μ to diﬀer across ﬁrms, writing μi for ﬁrm i.W e u s e ψ to denote the values of the other
underlying parameters (α, σ, λ1,a n dλ2) ,w h i c hw et a k et ob et h es a m ea c r o s sa l lﬁrms.
Adding anchoring. We assume anchoring eﬀects draw the distribution of preferences
toward the anchor from both directions. Formally, for any given values of α and d,l e tρ∗





max{0,min{e ρ + ζ,ρ∗}} if e ρ ≤ ρ∗
max{e ρ − ζ,ρ∗} if e ρ ≥ ρ∗
where ζ ≥ 0 is the anchoring parameter. Thus, the anchor shifts a worker’s as-if utility
weight by the amount ζ toward the weight that rationalizes the default, but not beyond.
The default is then the ideal point for all individuals with e ρ ∈ {ρ∗−ζ,ρ∗+ζ}, which implies
a spike in the distribution of choices at the default.
Both anchoring eﬀects and switching costs can produce bunching of choices at the default
option. However, switching costs tend to sweep out density near the default, creating a
trough in the distribution of choices, whereas anchoring (as we have formulated it) tends to
30I nt h ec a s eo fd =0it is the largest such value. In the case where d coincides with the match rate, it is
t h en e a r e s ts u c hv a l u et ot h ew o r k e r ’ se ρ parameter.
24shift each half of the distribution of e ρ toward the default, thereby creating a spike without
a neighboring trough. Thus, given our maintained hypotheses, we can separately identify ζ
and (λ1,λ2), and thereby evaluate the relative importance of the two explanations.
Adding time inconsistency and inattentiveness. We cannot identify the degree of as-if
time inconsistency or inattentiveness from the available data. However, interpreted through
the lens of the model with time inconsistency, estimates of the basic model yield the distri-
bution of
γ
β0. We infer the distribution of γ under the identifying assumption that β0 =0 .8
(which is roughly in line with the pertinent literature). Similarly, interpreted through the
lens of the model with inattentiveness, estimates of the basic model yield the distribution of
γ + χ(fp). Lacking any independent evidence concerning the magnitude of χ(fp),w eﬁxi t
at a value that implies a reasonable distribution of γ (as detailed below).
5.2 Calibration method
We ﬁt the model to distributions of employee contribution rates for a sample of ﬁrms that
changed their default contribution rates without altering other important features of their
401(k) plans, such as match rates. Workers at ﬁrm i picks r from a discrete set Ri ≡




M,a n dx = r + mi min{r,ri





0.01[(k − 1) + mi min{k − 1,100ri
M}],a n dK =1 0 0 r +1 .31








K−1(α),∞], such that an individual with
utility weight ρ and no opt-out costs will choose xi
k ∈ Xi iﬀ ρ ∈ Bi
k(α). With opt-out cost
γ and default d, a worker with ρ ∈ Bi





















31So, for example, if r =0 .15, ri
M =0 .06,a n dmi =0 .5,t h e nxi
M =0 .09 and Xi =
{0,0.015,...,0.075,0.09,0.1,...,0.17,0.18}.
25The probability that a worker at ﬁrm i chooses xi















k = d, we calculate the analogous probability as a residual:













We label the ﬁrms i =1 ,...,I.F i r m i has Si default regimes with default ds
i in regime
s.F o r e a c h ﬁrm and default regime s, Ns
ik is the number of individuals choosing rk at ﬁrm
i in regime k. We do not have information on workers’ characteristics; any inﬂuence of such









ik log[Pr i(xk | α,λi,d
s
i)].
To estimate the parameters, we maximize the log-likelihood.

















k(α,max{0,e ρ − ζ},d))dF(e ρ) if xi
k >d .
5.3 Data
Our data consist of distributions of 401(k) contribution rates for workers at three companies,
which compose a subset of those studied in Beshears et al. (2008), Choi et al. (2006),
Madrian and Shea (2001), and several other papers by combinations of those authors.33 We
focused on three particular companies for two reasons. First, all of them switched between
regimes with strictly positive default rates. We insisted on this feature because we were
32Data on worker characteristics would allow us to compute the welfare eﬀects of defaults for separate
subgroups, but it would not alter aggregate welfare eﬀects or the determination of the default rate that
maximizes total economic surplus.
33The data are the disaggregated distributions of contribution rates underlying Figure 3 in Beshears et al.
(2008) and Figures 2B and 2C in Choi et al. (2006). We thank Brigitte Madrian for her generous help in
providing these distributions.
26concerned that switching from a default of zero to a positive rate (which requires a change
to automatic enrollment) might be qualitatively diﬀerent than switching the default between
two positive rates. In practice, our model performed equally well in ﬁtting distributions for
zero and strictly positive default rates.34 Second, with few exceptions, features of the 401(k)
plans other than default rates remained stable across default regimes for all three ﬁrms.
For each company and default regime, the data indicate the fraction of recently eligible
employees who elected each allowable contribution rate.35 The various papers cited above
provide details concerning each of the three ﬁrms and their retirement plans. To conserve
space, we summarize the salient details in Table 1.
5.4 Estimates
Estimates of the basic model appear in Table 2. All parameters are estimated precisely.
The value of α is positive, as it must be for the model to generate spikes in the distributions
of contributions at the maximum matchable contribution rates. The mean utility weight
for each company accords with average contributions, and the associated standard deviation
reﬂects considerable heterogeneity among workers. An estimated 40% of workers act as if
opt-out costs are negligible.
The estimate of λ2, the as-if opt-out cost distribution parameter, is less reasonable. The
mean of γ (among the 60% of workers with positive opt-out costs) is 1
λ2 =0 .0847,a n d
the median is
ln(2)
λ2 =0 .0587. The monetary equivalent of a utility penalty γ,e v a l u a t e d
in a setting without 401(k) eligibility, is given by v(γ), the solution to V (0,1 − v(γ),θ)=
V (0,1,θ) − γ. For speciﬁcation (9), v(0.0847) = 0.0812 and v(0.0587) = 0.0567.I f , a s
an approximation, we construe the data as representing decisions taken over the ﬁrst year
of eligibility during which the worker earns $50,000, the monetary equivalent of γ is more
34Company 3 also operated under a regime with a 0% default rate. We discarded that data because, when
the company implemented automatic enrollment, it applied that policy retroactively to workers hired under
the 0% default regime.
35According to the previously cited papers, the data for all three companies cover employees with similar
tenure. It appears that included employees were generally eligible for several months to more than a year.
27than $4,000 at the mean of the distribution and more than $2,800 at the median. Yet it
is diﬃcult to believe that more than a handful of employees would actually turn down a
payment of several hundred dollars, let alone several thousand, to avoid making an active
401(k) election.
Why does the basic model require enormous opt-out costs to rationalize observed behav-
ior? For those who would save for retirement even without a 401(k), the EV associated with
401(k) eligibility must be very large due to matching provisions and tax deductibility. To
explain why many such individuals stop contributing when the default rate falls from 3% to
0%, one must assume that opt-out costs are extremely high.
Sophisticated time inconsistency does not resolve the puzzle. Only a value of β0 much
smaller than documented in the literature would render the implied distribution of γ plau-
sible. Nor does naive time inconsistency provide an adequate explanation: if the deadlines
for changing 401(k) elections are frequent (e.g., biweekly), workers would presumably learn
from numerous failures to follow through on intentions over the course of more than a year;
if they are infrequent (e.g., quarterly), the original puzzle remains. Given the paucity of
evidence on attention, it is more diﬃcult to evaluate the plausibility of the assumption that
workers are often inattentive to opportunities worth a few thousand dollars.
Consider next the model that allows for anchoring eﬀects (also Table 2). The estimates
of α, μ1, μ2, μ3,a n dσ change relatively little. The estimate of ζ reﬂects a large and
statistically signiﬁcant as-if anchoring eﬀect: anchoring can shift the utility weight (ρ)b y
up to roughly two-thirds of its standard deviation (σ). Signiﬁcantly, the estimated as-if
opt-out cost distribution changes dramatically. Only an estimated 10.9% of workers act as
if opt-out cost are negligible. However, the estimate of λ2 increases by almost two orders of
magnitude, reducing the implied value of v(γ) to 0.00134 at the mean, and 0.00093 at the
median — on the order of one-tenth of a percent of earnings in both cases. For an employee
earning $50,000 per year, the monetary equivalent of γ is therefore $67 at the mean and $46
at the median. Those magnitudes strike us as reasonable estimates of the amount a typical
28worker would be willing to accept in exchange for taking the time to ﬁll out a few forms.
Our analysis therefore suggests that bunching at the default option is primarily attributable
to anchoring rather than to opt-out costs.
Figure 1 illustrates, for the basic model, the ﬁtted and actual distributions of employee
contribution rates under each default regime for each of the three companies. The model
generally performs well, reproducing the spikes in the distributions at 0%, the default option,
the maximum matchable contribution rate, and the overall cap (though predictably missing
some smaller spikes at 10%). For the anchoring model, the ﬁt( n o ts h o w n )i ss l i g h t l yb e t t e r .
6 Welfare implications
6.1 The basic model
U s i n gt h eo u re s t i m a t e so ft h eb a s i cm o d e l ,w es i m u l a t ew o r k e r s ’c h o i c e sf o rv a r i o u sd e f a u l t
rates and conduct welfare analysis (suspending any disbelief concerning as-if opt-out cost
magnitudes). Figure 2 graphs average EV, as well as two opt-out frequencies: “overall opt-
out frequency,” the ratio of all opt-outs to all workers, and “zero-cost opt-out frequency,”
the ratio of opt-outs among those with zero opt-out costs to all workers. The average EV is
maximized and the opt-out frequencies minimi z e df o rad e f a u l tr a t ee q u a lt ot h em a x i m u m
matchable contribution rate (6%) at all three companies. Indeed, the EV-maximizing default
rate remains 6% for all three companies even when we vary the opt-out cost distribution
p a r a m e t e ro v e raw i d er a n g e . T h i sﬁnding reﬂects the importance of the forces that give
rise to Theorem 4.
With a default of 0%, the average EV is 7.07% of earnings for company 1, 1.97% for
company 2, and 2.75% for company 3. The ﬁgure is higher for company 1 because μ1
substantially exceeds μ2 and μ3, and because company 1 has a more generous matching
rate. By way of comparison, the average simulated employee and employer contributions
are, respectively, 6.90% and 4.35% for company 1, 3.45% and 1.22% for company 2, and
4.60% and 1.46% for company 3. Thus, in each case, the average EV roughly equals the
29employer contribution plus 20% to 40% of the employee contribution, which seems plausible.
With a default rate of 6%, the average EV rises to 9.86% for company 1 (an increase of
2.89 percentage points), 2.71% for company 2 (an increase of 0.74 percentage points), and
3.93% for company 3 (an increase of 1.18 percentage point). In each case, 27% to 30%
of the potential economic surplus ﬂowing from the 401(k) is lost when the default rate is
ineﬃciently set to zero. Those magnitudes, though very large, are not surprising in light of
the opt-out costs required to rationalize observed default eﬀects.
B e c a u s et h ei d e n t i t yo ft h eE V - m a x i m i z i n gd e f a u l tr a t ei nF i g u r e2i sd r i v e nb ym a t c h i n g
provisions, we next examine optimal defaults without a match. As mentioned in Section
2.1, we can use our model to simulate outcomes with the employer match for the current
period removed. We note, however, that our analysis may overstate the responsiveness of
contributions to the current match rate. By assuming V is diﬀerentiable, we attribute all
of the bunching at rM to the kink in the current period’s budget constraint. Part of that
bunching may be due to a kink in V , because (a) the current choice is somewhat persistent,
and (b) future matching creates a kink in the future opportunity set at rM.I f , h o w e v e r ,
the costs of switching arise from a new employee’s lack of familiarity with his employer’s
beneﬁts procedures, they may decline rapidly with tenure, in which case any induced kink
in V would be minor.
Figure 3 resembles Figure 2, except that we have removed the eﬀects of employer matching
provisions. Naturally, the EVs fall dramatically. The EV-maximizing default now diﬀers
considerably across the companies, reﬂecting the diﬀerences in μi: it is 13% for company 1
(with average EV equal to 4.60% of earnings), 2% for company 2 (with average EV equal to
1.08% of earnings), and 6% for company 3 (with average EV equal to 1.86% of earnings). The
eﬃciency losses associated with setting a default of zero are also smaller: 1.3% of earnings
at company 1, 0.03% at company 2, and 0.26% at company 3. Opt-out minimization now
leads to the wrong default rate for all three companies — 15% for company 1, and 0% for
companies 2 and 3 — illustrating the relevance of Theorem 3. However, the welfare losses
30from opt-out minimization are small for companies 1 and 2 (0.04% and 0.03% of earnings,
respectively) and modest at company 3 (0.26%).
Figure 2 raises the possibility that setting the default equal to the match cap may be
a good rule of thumb for companies oﬀering matching contributions. Figure 4 explores
the robustness of that ﬁnding. We simulate behavior for a range of match caps, and plot
the EV-maximizing default rate against the match cap. While the two rates coincide for
intermediate values, they diﬀer for low and high match caps, in some cases dramatically.
Maximization of average EV is only one possible objective. A policy maker who simply
wished to stimulate saving might choose the default rate that maximizes average employee
contributions. Contributions need not (and in some cases do not) increase monotonically
with the default rate. Nevertheless, in our base-case simulations, they are maximized when
the default equals the contribution cap; the resulting contribution rates are 11.2% for com-
pany 1, 8.3% for company 2, and 10.1% for company 3 (which has a higher cap). A similar
result holds with matching provisions removed.
The beneﬁts depicted in Figures 2 and 3 come at a cost. We graph the default rate
versus costs to the employer (matching contributions) and to the government (tax revenues)
in Figures 5(a) (the base case) and 5(b) (without matching provisions). We cannot perform
af u l ls o c i a lc o s t - b e n e ﬁt analysis because these costs pertain only to the current period.
6.2 Anchoring
Using the estimated model with as-if achoring eﬀects, we simulate workers’ choices for various
default rates. Figure 6 graphs average EVA, EVB, EV assessed from the perspective of an
arguably neutral frame, and the overall opt-out frequency against the default rate. We
assume the worker would act as if ζ =0in the neutral frame. That assumption appears
reasonable under a literal interpretation of the as-if utility function, but Bernheim (2009)
warns against such literalism. We acknowledge that more extensive data on framing eﬀects
would be required to justify properly the selection of a neutral frame.
Because our estimates imply low opt-out costs, Theorem 6 applies as an approximation.
31Thus, EVA is maximized at the highest allowable contribution rate, and EVB is maximized
at zero. Those peaks are unrelated to opt-out minimization or match caps. The substantial
gaps between EVA and EVB a r ed i r e c tr e ﬂections of the large anchoring eﬀects which create
wide regions of ambiguity. The gap is smallest for d =0 , but are large even in that case:
20.6% vs. 8.5% of earnings for company 1, 7.7% vs. 2.5% for company 2, and 9.7% vs. 3.4%
for company 3.
Figure 6 appears to suggest that a policy maker who wishes to “play it safe” should set
d =0(to maximize EVB), in which case the average beneﬁt employees receive from 401(k)
eligibility is unambiguously no less than 8.5% of earnings. However, that ﬁnding depends on
our choice of the initial regime used to evaluate EV. If the initial regime required a 401(k)
contribution equal to the overall cap, the EVB-maximizing (and apparently safest) choice
would then be to set the default equal to the cap.
In this setting, the large diﬀerences between EVA and EVB limit our ability to make
precise welfare statements unless we adopt a domain restriction. We therefore turn to EV
evaluated from the perspective of the putative neutral frame (henceforth EV-N). Strikingly,
all the EV-N curves in Figure 6 are virtually ﬂat. Regardless of the default rate, EV-N
is roughly 14.5% of earnings for company 1, 5% for company 2, and 6.5% for company
3. Technically, EV-N is maximized at 9% for company 1, and at the match cap (6%) for
companies 2 and 3, but the welfare loss from ineﬃciently setting a default of zero is only
0.35% of income for company 1 and 0.15% for companies 2 and 3. Because costs to the
employer and the government rise with the default rate,36 d =0emerges as socially optimal
in the neutral frame: it saves on costs while achieving nearly all the employee beneﬁts.
Figure 7 presents a second set of simulations with the companies’ matching provisions
removed. We observe similar patterns for EVA and EVB, although both measures of surplus
are much lower without the match. The default rate continues to make relatively little
diﬀerence in the neutral frame, as the EV-N curves are once again nearly ﬂat. Though
36Graphs of employer and government costs versus the default rate appear in the online appendix; they
are very similar to those shown in Figure 5, which pertains to the model without anchoring eﬀects.
32the stakes are small, EV-N is maximized at the contribution limit for company 1, 0% for
company 2, and 8% for company 3.
6.3 Time-inconsistency and inattentiveness
Finally, we examine welfare with as-if time inconsistency and inattentiveness. To start, we
assume that opt-out decisions are made in the prevailing frames (f0 i nt h ec a s eo ft i m e
inconsistency, fp in the case of inattentiveness). The simulated distributions of workers’
choices are then the same as in Section 6.1. Figure 8 graphs average EVA and EVB against
the default rate for each of the three companies. For EVA, any incurred opt-out costs are
simply discounted by the assumed value of β. W ec a l i b r a t eo u rm o d e l su s i n gβ =0 .8 in
the case of time inconsistency and β =0 .015 in the case of inattentiveness. We select the
latter value because it generates a reasonable distribution of opt-out costs (the mean is $63
and the median $44 for a worker earning $50,000 per year). In both cases, EVB is the same
as for the basic model; we calculate it by applying no discount to measured opt-out costs,
which amounts to using β =1 .
Surprisingly, varying the value of β used to evaluate welfare from 0.015 to unity has no
impact on the EV-maximizing default rate (the maximum matchable contribution rate of
6% in all cases), and only a small eﬀect on the level of EV for any given default. Thus,
when one interprets the data through the lens of as-if time inconsistency or inattentiveness,
the scope of ambiguity concerning welfare, [EVB,EV A], is rather small, despite the presence
of large default eﬀects. The reason is simple: for the range of default rates considered, the
populations of opt-outs are dominated by workers whose opt-out costs are zero or relatively
small. Therefore, even though average opt-out costs are enormous from the perspective of
the prevailing frame, discounting them heavily makes little diﬀerence.
Figure 9 presents a second set of simulations with the companies’ matching provisions
removed. Here, the model and frame of evaluation matter a bit more than in Figure 8, but
not dramatically. Even with inattentiveness (for which we discount measured opt-out costs
to a much larger degree), the diﬀerences between EVA and EVB remain modest, and both
33measures of consumer surplus are maximized at similar values (14% versus 13% for company
1, 0% versus 2% for company 2, and 6% in both cases for company 3).
Surprisingly, we therefore ﬁnd that the degree to which time inconsistency or inattention
inﬂates opt-out costs is not terribly consequential either for the optimal default rate or for
the magnitude of the economic beneﬁts workers derive from 401(k) plans, assuming workers
make the opt-out choice in the prevailing frame. What then of the ﬁnding in Carroll et al.
(2009) that an extreme default is optimal from the forward-looking perspective when β is
suﬃciently low? The result still holds, but only for very small β (e.g., 0.015, not 0.8), and
for defaults substantially outside the range considered, where the evaluation frame matters
to a much greater degree. For each company, the EV curve with β =0 .015 reaches a
minimum at a default rate near 30%, and then increases monotonically, achieving a plateau
and a global maximum for default rates above 90% (see the online appendix).
As an alternative to an extreme default rate, employers could penalize workers for failing
to make active 401(k) elections. We therefore perform simulations in which we optimize
over penalties and default rates simultaneously. From the perspective of the forward-looking
frame (β =0 .8), the optimal penalty is always zero and the optimal default problem is as
before. From the perspective of the attentive frame (β =0 .015), the optimal penalty is
enormous (roughly 40% of earnings) and the default is of practically no consequence. We
can overturn the latter result by assuming that some small fraction of the population, η,
never makes an active decision. But as we increase η from zero, there is a sharp transition
(e.g., at around η =0 .007 for company 1 with a match) to a regime in which the optimal
penalty is zero and the optimal default problem is as before. Figure 10 shows why we never
obtain a small optimal penalty. Fixing a default rate of 6%, the ﬁgure graphs average EVA
for company 1 against the size of the penalty (measured as a fraction of earnings) with η
r a n g i n gf r o mz e r ot o1 % . E a c hc u r v eh a st w ol o c a lm a x i m a ,o n ea tz e r oa n do n ea ta
massive penalty. Varying η simply determines which is the global optimum. Thus, the
availability of a penalty either does not change the optimal default problem, or renders it
34virtually irrelevant.
So far we have focused on the selection of a default rate assuming decisions are made in the
prevailing frame. As mentioned in Section 4.2, we can also treat the decision frame as a policy
variable. Figures 11 (with matching provisions) and 12 (without matching provisions) display
simulated opt-out frequencies for decisions made not only in the prevailing institutional frame
(as above), but also in the forward-looking frame for the case of time inconsistency (assuming
β =0 .8) and the fully attentive frame for the case of inattentiveness (assuming β =0 .015).
The decision frame plainly has a large eﬀect on aggregate behavior within the calibrated
inattentiveness model, but a much smaller eﬀect within the calibrated time inconsistency
model due to the disperseness of the estimated opt-out cost distribution.
Figure 13 graphs average EVA and EVB against the default rate when the opt-out decision
is made in the forward-looking and fully attentive frames (for the cases of time inconsistency
and inattentiveness respectively). For our calibrated model of time inconsistency, the curves
diﬀer only slightly from their counterparts in Figure 8, which pertain to decisions made in
the contemporaneous frame; there is a tiny increase in normative ambiguity. The surpris-
ing ﬁnding that the decision frame has practically no eﬀect on welfare is explained by its
small impact on opt-out frequencies (Figure 11). In contrast, for our calibrated model of
inattentiveness, the curves in Figure 13 diﬀer dramatically from their counterparts in Figure
8. Switching choices from the partially attentive to fully attentive frames substantially
increases EVA and decreases EVB. As a result, ambiguity concerning welfare, measured by
the gap between EVA and EVB, increases dramatically. Accordingly, unless one has ade-
quate objective grounds for excluding the partially attentive frame from the welfare-relevant
domain, shifting decisions to the fully attentive frame has the disadvantage of introducing
substantially normative ambiguity. All of these conclusions also hold in simulations where
the companies’ matching provisions are removed (see Figure 14).
357 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have attempted to make two distinct types of contributions. From a
substantive perspective, we have oﬀered new conceptual observations and quantitative results
concerning a policy issue of considerable practical importance. From a methodological
perspective, we have demonstrated the practicality of the framework for behavioral welfare
economics developed in Bernheim and Rangel (2009).
Naturally, the paper leaves many important questions unanswered. More research is
required to distinguish empirically between the choice patterns associated with the various
theories of default eﬀects, and to justify the restrictions on the welfare-relevant domain that
are in some cases required to obtain usefully discerning conclusions. There may also be
other explanations for default eﬀects that we have not yet explored. For example, the opt-
out costs captured by our models are properly interpreted as the costs of implementing a
decision, rather than the costs of reaching the decision. Costly decision making is notoriously
diﬃcult to model, as one is quickly drawn into an inﬁnite regress: determining whether a
problem is worth solving requires the individual to solve a more diﬃcult problem; whether
that problem is worth solving requires him to solve yet another problem; and so forth. We
leave such matters to future studies.
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Food Insurance Chemicals Industry 
1998-2002 1997-2001 2002-2003 Dates observed
Up to 25%, 
censored at 18%
15% 15% Contribution limit 
6% 6% 6% Maximum matchable
contribution
50% 50% 100% Matching rate
3%, 4% 0%, 3%, 6% 3%, 6% Default regimes
Company 3 Company 2 Company 1 Parameter
Table 1: Description of the companies
 
Source: Beshears et al. (2008) for Company 1, and Choi et al. (2006) for Companies 2 and 3". 
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Figure 7: Average equivalent variation and opt-out frequency, with anchoring and no 































●  = EVA, inattentiveness 
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Figure 9: Average equivalent variation with time inconsistency or inattentiveness and no 































η = 0.0% 
η = 0.2% 
η = 0.5% 
η = 0.7% 
η = 1.0% 
 
Figure 10: Average equivalent variation as a function of the penalty for inactive choice, 
for company 1 with a default of 6% and an employer match, various values of η (the 
































●  = inattentiveness, frame fa 
■  = time inconsistency, frame f-1 
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●  = EVA, inattentiveness 
▲ = EVB, inattentiveness  
■  = EVA, time inconsistency 































































Figure 13:  Average equivalent variation, decisions made in the forward-looking frame 
for time inconsistency and in the fully attentive frame for inattentiveness, with an 































●  = EVA, inattentiveness 
▲ = EVB, inattentiveness  
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Figure 14:  Average equivalent variation, decisions made in the forward-looking frame 
for time inconsistency and in the fully attentive frame for inattentiveness, with no 
employer match   